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Abstract
This paper complements previous studies on the effects of health on wages
by addressing the problems of unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection,
and endogeneity in one comprehensive framework. Using data from the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) we find the health variable to suffer
from measurement error and a number of tests provide evidence that selec-
tion corrections are necessary. Good health leads to higher wages for men,
while there appears to be no significant effect for women. Contingent on
the method of estimation, healthy males are estimated to earn between 1.3%
and 7.8% more than those in poor health.
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21 Introduction
Does superior health enable individuals to command higher wages? This question
has spurred research in both labor and health economics and consequently led to
the identification of two major channels of interaction. First, health as part of
human capital may positively affect labor market productivity and hence wages.
Second, as Grossman (2001) points out, if marginal benefits of investment in health
increase with the salary, health should rise with wages. Thus, reverse causality may
lead to biased estimates of the health effect. A number of further challenges need
to be dealt with: while inaccuracies in assessing health status may introduce bias
due to measurement error whenever self-reported health satisfaction is used in the
estimations, another problem that remains unappreciated in most earlier studies
is non-random sample selection. Since labor market participation is endogenous
and health status is one of the influences driving selection, failing to apply selec-
tion correction methods may result in inconsistent estimation. Finally, an issue
particularly relevant in the health context is unobserved heterogeneity. Whenever
unobserved factors such as genetic endowment are correlated with health, the use
of panel data techniques to account for omitted variable bias is called for.
The impact of health on wages has been studied using a variety of econometric
approaches, accounting for the above problems to different extents: Gambin (2005)
investigates the relationship between health and wages for 14 European countries
employing fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) estimation. She proposes that for
men, self-reported health has a greater effect than for females, while in the case
of chronic diseases the opposite holds true. An econometric model that accounts
for the simultaneous effects of health and wages in a structural multi-equation
system has been suggested by Lee (1982). His approach is based on a generalized
version of Heckman’s (1978) treatment model. Using a cross-sectional sample of
male US citizens, he finds that health and wages are strongly interrelated, that
is, wages positively affect health and vice versa. In a similar vein, Cai (2007)
estimates a multi-equation system using cross-sectional Australian data and finds
health to have a positive effect on wages once endogeneity is accounted for. He
also finds that there is no endogenous selection present in his data. Haveman,
Wolfe, Kreider, and Stone (1994) estimate a multiple equation system for working
time, wages, and health, employing generalized methods of moments techniques
on panel data. They find that in the male US population poor health affects
wages negatively. The effect of self-assessed general and psychological health on
wages is at the core of Contoyannis and Rice’s (2001) study using the British
Household Panel Survey. They apply FE and RE instrumental variable estimators
and conclude that reduced psychological health decreases male wages, while positive
self-assessed health increases hourly wages for women. While each of these papers
tackles at least one of the mentioned econometric issues, to our knowledge there is
no study that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, non-random sample selection
and endogeneity in one framework.
In order to fill this gap, we utilize a recently developed estimation method
proposed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2006), which extends Wooldridge’s (1995)
3method of testing and correcting for sample selection in fixed effects models. The
latter estimator has been contrasted with alternative methods proposed by Kyriazi-
dou (1997) and Rochina-Barrachina (1999) in an application to female wage equa-
tions by Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007). While Kyriazidou’s (1997) es-
timator implies homoscedastic idiosyncratic errors over time, Rochina-Barrachina
(1999) does not rely on this assumption. The drawback of their method, how-
ever, is that it assumes joint normality of the error terms in the probit and the
main equation. Wooldridge’s (1995) method relies on standard probit estimates
for each year in order to calculate annual inverse Mills ratios (IMRs) and explicitly
models the conditional mean of the error terms in the main equation. Its advan-
tage over the other models that have been suggested is that it does not rely on
any known distribution of the errors in the equation of interest, and allows them
to be time heteroscedastic and serially correlated in an unspecified way. One ap-
proach to expanding these three estimators to account for non-strict exogeneity
and measurement error is presented in Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007).
Similarly, Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) enhance Wooldridge’s (1995) estimator
and demonstrate how to test and control for sample selection in a fixed effects model
with endogeneity. The reason we choose to adopt the Semykina and Wooldridge
(2006) approach in this paper is that, other than the alternative methods, it allows
for time heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms in both equations.
The estimator is applied to male and female samples taken from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). We find the health variable to be reported with
error and a number of tests provide evidence that corrections for non-random se-
lection into the workforce are indicated in both the female and male sample. We
show that the impact of health on wages is statistically different from zero for men
only. For them, a highly significant effect of health on wages, associated with up
to 7.8% of a health premium is found and cannot be eradicated by applying selec-
tion correction. Considering non-random selection into the work force is, however,
associated with lower wages on each health level for both genders.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the starting point is a
discussion of specification issues and resulting problems, followed by a detailed
overview of the estimation methods in section 3. The ensuing section 4 provides
data descriptions and discusses various specifications of the health variable. In
section 5 we report estimation and test results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Specification and Resulting Problems
To fix ideas, a simple model of how health affects wages is presented. A firm
produces Yt at time t = (1, 2, ..., T ), using effective labor Lt as the single input
in producing Yt. The firms’s production function is given by Yt = F (Lt), and the
amount of effective labor can be written as
Lt =
n∑
i=1
pi(Ei, ai,t, hi,t) · `i,t, (1)
4where `i,t is labor supply of employee i, and pi(·) is an unknown function that
determines the effectiveness of an individual’s working hours `i,t. This function
takes as arguments the years of education Ei, age ai,t, and state of health hi,t. In
what follows, we refer to the first two variables as the human capital part of pi(·)
and to the latter part as health effect.
Workers are paid according to their marginal productivity, and accordingly the
log wage of each employee can be written as
logwi,t = log[
dF
dLt
· ∂Lt
∂`i,t
] = logFLt + log pi(Ei, ai,t, hi,t), (2)
such that wages are determined by the firm-level supply and demand factors logFLt
as well as by the employee-level human capital and health effects.
In what follows, we describe the operationalization of the latter two effects and
derive the baseline econometric model.
The Human Capital Part. The human capital part of pi(·) is approximated
using a specification similar to Mincer (1958 and 1974). He suggested that log
wages are linear in the years of schooling, and linear and quadratic in the years
of labor market experience. Romeu Gordo (2006), however, finds evidence for the
existence of a positive relationship between unemployment and health satisfaction
using GSOEP data. On this account, we include unemployment rather than work-
ing experience. Adding an age variable then implicitly controls for work experience
as well. Furthermore, human capital theory suggests using firm tenure as a proxy
for the firm-specific investment in human capital. Since firm tenure (and its square)
is more closely related to labor productivity than the general working experience
it should cause an extra increase in wages.
The Health Effect. As stated earlier, health is an essential part of human capital
and will thus affect labor market productivity which in turn determines wages. We
use self-assessed health satisfaction as our key explanatory variable, the definition
and functional form of which is discussed in detail in section 4.2.
Dependent variable and baseline specification. While health as a part of
human capital directly affects productivity, it can also be considered an endogenous
capital stock, which according to Grossman (2001) determines the amount of time
an individual can spend participating in the labor market. One reason that the
number of hours worked diverges somewhat across individuals may therefore lie in
differences in health status and so we will use hourly wages rather than monthly
earnings as the dependent variable.
The above model can then be parameterised as follows:
log(wi,t) = bB,tα+ fi,tβ + ai,tγ + θEi + uei,tυ + fti,tτ
+ chi,tρ+ δg(hi,t) + dui,tpi + error, (3)
5where wi,t are hourly wages, bB,t is a vector that approximates firm level supply
and demand forces (logFLt) by using the average number of job-seekers, notified
vacancies, and (un)employment figures at the state (Bundesstaat) level B.1 The
vector of dummy variables fi,t captures four different categories of firm size, ai,t is
the vector of a 3rd order polynomial of age ai,t and Ei denotes years of schooling or
training. Second order polynomials of uneemployment experience and firm tenure
are captured in uei,t and fti,t, respectively. chi,t are the number of children in
three age categories and g(hi,t) is a yet to be determined function of the health
variable. Finally, dui,t are indicator variables for firm sector, occupational status,
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East Germany, part-time work, nationality, children, and time periods.3
In the estimation of the parameter vector (α′,β′,γ ′, θ,υ′, τ ′,ρ′, δ,pi′)′ in equa-
tion (3) a number of problems arise. To start with, Grossman (2001) suggests that
the rate of return to (gross) investment in health equals the additional availability
of healthy time, evaluated at the hourly wage rate. This means that health should
rise with wages as the marginal benefits of health investment increase with the
wage rate, implying that hi,t is simultaneously determined along with wi,t. As we
employ self-reported health satisfaction, measurement error can also be an impor-
tant source of bias. In the absence of an “objective” measure, such as a physician’s
evaluation of overall health, δ will likely be biased towards zero. Another problem
arises if a random sample drawn from the overall population is not available. In
this study, we aim to identify the effect of health on the labor market productivity
for all individuals, thus a bias may result from the fact that individuals endoge-
nously decide to participate in the labor market. If some of the factors determining
participation also affect health and wages, selection correction methods are in or-
der. Omitted variable bias is also a cause of concern. Disregarding, e.g. genetic
endowment of a person could lead to biased estimates as it may at the same time
impact health status and hourly wages.4 The following section explains how we
deal with these issues econometrically.
3 Econometric Approach
As indicated above, the goal of this work is to make statements about the impact
of health on wages for the entire population. Thus, with panel data, employing a
simple within estimator is a reasonable approach only when we can be sure that
the decision to participate in the labor market is either randomly determined or
1Data provided by the German Federal Employment Agency, Nuremberg.
2Interaction terms between the occupational status and the health variables as well as between
age and health were found to be statistically insignificant and consequently dropped from the final
model.
3Variable descriptions are shown in tables 6 and 7
4Past shocks (such as heart attacks, accidents, etc.) may affect current state of health (Con-
toyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) and Halliday and Burns (2005)). As far as differences in the
ability to cope with such (past) health shocks aren’t covered by unobserved effects, endogeneity
may be introduced. Considering the full dynamics of health on top of all sources of endogeneity
mentioned above is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
6fully covered by the observable variables or the fixed effect. In the context of this
paper it is entirely conceivable that unobserved time varying health determinants
such as the lifestyle an individual engages in (think of alcohol, nicotine, sports) or
motivation affect selection and will not be covered by the fixed effect. This kind of
selection will then influence wages through the error term and lead to inconsistent
estimation. To overcome the selection problem, the following model is estimated:
w∗i,t = β0 + xi,tβ1 + y
∗
i,tβ2 + ci + ui,t, (4)
w∗i,t = wi,t, y
∗
i,t = yi,t if si,t = 1 and unobserved otherwise, (5)
S∗i,t = γ0 + ki + zi,tγ + ei,t; Si,t = 1[S
∗
i,t > 0] (6)
where all variables superscripted with an asterisk pertain to the entire popu-
lation. In (4), w∗i,t are hourly wages and the 1 × K vector xi,t comprises those
explanatory variables in (3) that we observe irrespective of participation, including
health. Variables that can only be observed for those who work make up y∗i,t and
are imposed as exclusion restrictions on the participation equation. Unobserved
individual characteristics are contained in ci, ui,t is an unobserved error term and
Si,t in (5) denotes labor market participation. Equation (6) describes a person’s
decision to participate in the labor market, where S∗i,t is the latent propensity to
work, 1[.] is an indicator function which equals one if its argument is true, and the
1×G vector zi,t is a superset of xi,t. Though not strictly necessary, it is advanta-
geous to have G > K, which is why we add exclusion restrictions to zi,t that drive
selection but can at the same time be omitted from equation (4). The individual
effect ki is composed of unobserved characteristics and exhibits no variation over
time. Furthermore, ei,t, which is normally distributed with standard deviation σ
e
t ,
is uncorrelated with ki and zi, with. zi = (zi,1, ..., zi,T ) and t = (1, 2, ..., T ).
Following Mundlak (1978), Chamberlain (1984) and Wooldridge (1995), write
ki as a linear projection onto the time averages of zi, denoted z¯i, a constant as well
as an error ai. Then, (6) can be rewritten as:
S∗i,t = θ0 + z¯iθ + zi,tγ + vi,t, (7)
where the composite error term vi,t = ai + ei,t is independent of zi and allowed to
be heterogeneously distributed over time and there are no restrictions imposed on
the correlation between vi,t and vi,s for s 6= t.
Two assumptions concerning the wage equation (Wooldridge 1995 and 2002)
ensure that no restrictions are imposed on how ui,t relates to vi,s, s 6= t.5 First, ui,t
is a linear function of vi,t and mean independent of zi conditional on vi,t. Second,
similar to the selection equation, the unobserved effect is modeled as a projection
of ci onto (x¯i, y¯
∗
i , vi,t) and an error term bi.
6 This method specifically models
5Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007) call this condition “contemporaneous exogeneity”
of the selection process.
6It should be noted that this assumption is rather restrictive, as it allows only for time-
invariant unobserved effects to be correlated with the explanatory variables in equation (4). For
time-variant latent variables Wooldridge’s (1995) estimator may thus be inconsistent.
7the unobserved effect such that correlation between ci and (xi,y
∗
i , vi,t) is possible.
Under these assumptions, equation (4) can be rewritten as:
w∗i,t = ϕ0 + x¯iϕ1 + xi,tβ1 + y¯
∗
iϕ2 + y
∗
i,tβ2 + ξtλi,t + ri,t, (8)
where ri,t = bi+ li,t and li,t is the remaining part of ui after including the inverse
Mills ratios (IMRs). The IMRs λi,t are obtained by estimating equation (7) with
standard probit methods for each t. Since si,s (s 6= t), does not influence λi,t,
the error term ri,t is allowed to be correlated with λi,s. Equation (8) (with λi,t
replaced by λˆi,t) can therefore be consistently estimated by pooled OLS. We follow
Wooldridge (1995) and construct standard errors robust to serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity which are also adjusted for the additional variation introduced
by the estimation of T probit models in the first step.
While estimation of equation (8) assumes (strict) exogeneity of the explanatory
variables, Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) provide an estimation method based on
Wooldridge (1995) that allows for endogeneity in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity and sample selection: analogous to the above derivations, the
starting point is the model in equations (4),(5) and (6). Presume, however, that
the health variable (as part of xi,t in equation (4)) is correlated with ui,t. As it
stands, health is part of zi,t but at the same time ui,t must not be correlated with
zi,t. Hence, the health variable is removed from zi,t and replaced by a proxy for
health which exhibits no correlation with ui,t and can thus serve as an additional
exclusion restriction in the participation equation. The resulting 1 × G vector is
denoted qi,t and its time averages q¯i and qi itself also replace z¯i and zi,t in (7).
An estimator that allows vi,t in (7) to be correlated with ui,t and ci in (4) when
the health variable is endogenous can be obtained by maintaining the assumptions
underlying equation (8) and replacing x¯i with q¯i. Thus, analogous to (8) we can
write:
w∗i,t = ϕ0 + q¯iϕ1 + xi,tβ1 + y¯
∗
iϕ2 + y
∗
i,tβ2 + ξtλi,t + ri,t. (9)
Again, the first step is to estimate T standard probit models, and calculate the
IMRs λˆi,t. Because ri,t is allowed to be correlated with λi,s for s 6= t (i.e. λi,t is not
strictly exogenous in (9)), a consistent way of estimating (9) is pooled 2SLS, where
1, q¯i,qi,t, y¯
∗
i ,y
∗
i,t, λˆi,t serve as (their own) instruments. Standard errors robust to
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity are calculated as suggested by Semykina
and Wooldridge (2006). They are adjusted for the additional variation introduced
by the estimation of T probit models in the first step and they also account for the
use of the pooled 2SLS estimator.
4 Data and Descriptives
The data used in this analysis is taken from twelve consecutive annual waves of
the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), provided by the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW). The GSOEP, which is representative
of the German population, started in 1984 with about 12,200 observations from
8the western German states. In June 1990, another 4,400 individuals living in the
territory of the former German Democratic Republic were added in order to expand
the GSOEP to the eastern part of Germany.
4.1 Sample Construction
For the empirical analysis, we use observations from all sub-samples between 1995
and 2006, with the exception of samples G (“Oversampling of High Income House-
holds”) and H (“Refreshment 2006”).7 We extract data on the variables described
in tables 6 and 7 in the appendix. The sample is constrained to persons older than
17 and younger than 66 years. Also excluded are those who are self-employed,
self-employed in the agricultural sector, work in the family business, are on mater-
nity leave, drafted for mandatory military or civilian service as well as individuals
who serve an apprenticeship, trainees, interns, volunteers, aspirants, pensioners,
and those still in education. Marginally or irregularly employed persons are also
removed from the estimation sample. Motivated by two arguments, we choose to
exclude (severely) handicapped people from the analysis, too. First, firms may
discriminate against handicapped individuals, irrespective of their productivity.
Hence, their wages may be artificially low or they might even drop out of the labor
market due to discrimination, which is not meant to be captured in the selection
equation. Secondly, in Germany severely handicapped people often work at spe-
cial “sheltered workshops” where they are not paid according to their marginal
productivity.
Hourly wages are derived by dividing gross individual earnings in the month
before the interview by 4.3 (the average number of weeks per month) and then
dividing the resulting weekly wage by the usual working time per week.8 Any extra
salaries like Christmas or holiday bonuses, 13th monthly pay, or child benefits are
not taken into account. Suspiciously high or low wage rates were manually checked
and dropped if necessary. Wages (as well as all other financial variables) are deflated
to their year 2001 real values using the eastern and western CPIs and, if necessary,
converted into Euro equivalents.9
Participation in the labor market is constituted by having worked for pay in the
month before the interview. In the participation equations both working and non-
working adults are used for estimation. Since the econometric approach includes
linear probability models, which exploit within transformations, individuals who
appear for only one year are removed from the estimation sample.
71995 is chosen as starting point because the key variable “number of doctor visits” is not
available in 1994. Sub-samples A through D constitute the “base data”, sub-samples E and F are
refreshment samples, which start in 1998 and 2000, respectively. The 2006 refreshment sample H
is excluded, because by definition every person in this sample is observable for only one year.
8Usual hours are chosen due to their invariance to short term health problems. Including the
effects of short term health issues on hours may bias hourly wages upwards as paid sick days
are common practice in Germany. Contractual hours are used instead of usual working time
whenever the former exceed the latter.
9For this purpose, Consumer Price Indices included in the $pequiv files of the GSOEP are
used.
9Table 8 shows how the stepwise exclusion of different groups leads to an esti-
mation sample of 9, 277 females and 8, 847 males, resulting in 57, 203 and 57, 419
observations, respectively. For the estimation of the wage equations, persons who
participate in the labor market for only one year are dropped from the sample.
Due to this restriction and because individuals with missing wages who declare
participation are defined as participating in the selection equations, the number
of observations in the wage equations differs from the working population in the
probit sample.
In the time period considered, about 69% of the female and around 86% of the
male sample population participate in the labor market and male real hourly wages
are on average about 0.22 log points higher than those of women. Tables 13 and 14
in the appendix compare variables in the participation equations for working and
non-working individuals, tables 15 and 16 provide detailed summary statistics for
variables used in the wage equations.
4.2 Health Variable
The GSOEP health measure asks individuals to state how satisfied they currently
are with their health on a categorial scale ranging from zero to ten. As the func-
tional form is a priori unclear, three specifications of the health variable are em-
ployed in order to gain insight into the relationship between health and participa-
tion/wages: (i) without any further transformations, implying a log-linear relation-
ship, (ii) using a log-log model, as suggested by equation (2)10 and (iii) splitting
health satisfaction into four dummy variables, thus producing a flexible nonlin-
ear specification.11 Table 10 in the appendix shows results of these preliminary
regressions for both the wage and participation equations.12
The coefficients of the health variable(s) turn out to be significantly different
from zero in all specifications, for both women and men, and in the wage and
participation equations. An important observation is that health satisfaction affects
wages and labor market participation nonlinearly. This becomes evident in both
the log-log and the dummy specification. In the latter, throughout the categories
excellent, good, and medium health an increasing effect of health satisfaction at
a diminishing rate is revealed. For example, in the case of female labor supply,
reducing health from excellent to good has a much smaller effect (0.001) than
reducing it further to medium health (0.021). Equally stated, diminishing health
from excellent to good in the male sample affects wages less strongly (0.006) than
reducing it from good to medium (0.03).
10Health satisfaction is transformed as follows: g(hi,t) = log(hi,t +
√
(h2i,t + 1)), which is a
parallel translation of the log function, where g(hi,t = 0) = 0.
11According to the frequency distribution in the appendix (table 9), we define poor (cat. 0−4),
medium (cat. 5 − 6), good (cat. 7 − 8), and excellent health (cat. 9 − 10), where the first one
serves as basis category.
12To make parameters directly interpretable, we employ linear probability models to estimate
the participation equations in columns (4), (5), and (6). In all specifications further explanatory
variables (see tables 3, 4 and 11, 12) are included but not reported.
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Based on these results and given that almost 90% of the observations are al-
located over the categories excellent, good, and medium health (see table 9), the
health measure should exhibit some kind of nonlinear specification, where wages
and the probability to work increase with health at diminishing rates. For prag-
matic reasons, instead of choosing the more flexible dummy variable specification,
we decide to rely on the log-log structure. First, its functional form most closely
approximates the model suggested in equation (2). Second, only one instrument is
needed when implementing the log-log form, which is especially important for the
IV-approaches to the participation equations in section 5.1. Finally, it still allows
for increasing returns to health at a decreasing rate – the relevant functional form
for 90% of all observations.
The observed mean of this log-health variable for working females between 1995
and 2006 is 2.579, while the value for non-working women is smaller at 2.482 log
points. For males, the working to non-working health ratio is 2.594 to 2.40. The
hypothesis of the equality of means between the working and non-working group
can be rejected on the basis of two standard t-tests, t = 25.22 (p-value = 0) for
females and t = 39.73 (p-value = 0) for males.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Participation Equations
Health is expected to influence the decision to participate in the labor market as
well as wages. Thus, in order to gain insight on the extensive margin, tables 11 and
12 in the appendix present estimation results for the Mundlak-type specification
needed for the Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) estimators
as well as five additional specifications. The exclusion restrictions we propose
are: non-labour income, a binary variable for having a partner, partner’s net wage
and second degree polynomials of the partner’s age, labor market experience and
education as well as an indicator variable for whether the partner variables were
missing though the presence of a partner is reported.
As a means of coping with the possible endogeneity of health in the participa-
tion equation we employ computationally undemanding (FE-)IV linear probability
specifications in columns (3) and (4). Here, the number of doctor visits in the last
three months serves as an instrument for the health variable.13 The intuition is
that “doctor visits” approximate past investment and depreciation in health and
account for past shocks affecting current health satisfaction. At the same time
“doctor visits” should not have an effect on wages other than through health sta-
tus.14 Columns (1) and (2) display pooled OLS and within results to allow a check
13For an example of how an endogenously reported health measure may affect wages see Stern
(1989). In his paper he uses symptoms or diseases as instruments for endogenously reported
disability and labour force participation.
14One issue our instrument probably doesn’t resolve is that people may justify non-participation
in the labor market by reporting low health, such that there is actually an omitted variable, say,
“motivation”. If these individuals visit physicians in order to justify their non-participation in the
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of the IV specifications against na¨ıve estimators.
The estimated coefficients of the health variable turn out to be significantly
different from zero for both women and men and in all four linear specifications.
Comparing the parameters in columns (3), (4) with (1), (2) shows that, as is ex-
pected in the presence of measurement error, the coefficients of health satisfaction
using IV methods are larger than those in the pooled OLS or within model.15 On
the other hand, the inclusion of unobserved effects reduces the estimated parame-
ters in columns (2) and (4) in comparison to (1) and (3), i.e. correlation between
the health variable and latent individual heterogeneity is associated with an upward
bias.
Column (5) provides a pooled probit model, which assumes that the explana-
tory variables are independent of any unobserved effect.16 Column (6) applies the
Mundlak specification – as laid out in section 3 – to the pooled sample. Based
on the above mentioned hints that “health satisfaction” may be endogenous in the
selection equations, in the pooled probit (5) and Mundlak-type (6) specifications
the possibly endogenous “health satisfaction” variable is replaced by “number of
doctor visits” which we assume to be exogenous and which reflects health satisfac-
tion. Thus, the “doctor visits” variable effectively serves as an additional exclusion
restriction, increasing their total number to eleven. This procedure follows Se-
mykina and Wooldridge (2006) and Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina’s (2007)
method. It is strictly necessary for the Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) estimator
and also applied to the pooled probit estimator in order to enable comparison. In
line with columns (1) through (4), a higher number of doctor visits (i.e. lower
health) is associated with a significantly lower probability of participation in both
probit specifications.
As coefficients in linear and nonlinear models cannot readily be compared, ta-
ble 1 provides participation probabilities of “average” individuals, which differ only
with respect to their state of health (actually, they differ only with respect to the
mean values of health/doctor visits within each of the four health categories poor,
medium, good, excellent; see section 5.1). For a healthy woman the pooled probit
probability of participation (column (5)) is 13 percentage points higher than for
a female of poor health. Controlling for correlated individual effects (column (6))
reduces the probability difference to a mere 1.5 percentage points. The linear spec-
ifications in columns (1) and (2) reveal the same pattern: When applying pooled
OLS the probability to work is about 11 percentage points higher for healthy than
for unhealthy women; the gap shrinks to 2 percentage points when implementing
the within transformation. Columns (3) and (4) display the instrumental variables
same fashion, the instrument may be invalid. However, as long as physicians do not issue sick notes
to people who are healthy, there is really no reason to arrange such appointments. Additionally,
as long as “motivation” is time invariant, the individual effects in column (6) should take care of
the problem.
15Heteroskedasticity robust, regression based Hausman tests in the spirit of Wooldridge (2002)
confirm systematic differences between the health coefficients in columns (3), (4) and (1), (2).
16In columns (5) and (6), a robust variance covariance matrix accounts for the fact that observa-
tions are correlated within individuals over time. Under more restrictive assumptions, ‘traditional’
random effects probit estimation is possible; results for these models are available on request.
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estimates. Again, the fixed effects approach reduces the probability gap; however,
the magnitude of the gaps is larger than without controlling for endogeneity.
Table 1: Participation Probabilities (in %), by different Health
Groups, Women and Men, 1995-2006
Women
OLS Within 2SLS FE-2SLS Probit Mundlak Pr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poor health 61.6 67.3 54.1 55.8 71.4 72.7
Medium health 67.4 68.5 66.0 66.3 73.2 73.6
Good health 70.3 69.1 71.8 71.5 74.0 74.0
Excellent health 72.1 69.4 75.6 74.8 74.4 74.2
Men
OLS Within 2SLS FE-2SLS Probit Mundlak Pr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poor health 76.9 83.3 71.1 74.9 93.9 94.6
Medium health 84.2 85.5 83.0 83.8 94.7 94.9
Good health 87.7 86.5 88.8 88.1 95.0 95.0
Excellent health 90.0 87.2 92.6 90.9 95.1 95.1
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. Participation probabilities are based on different binary choice
models (see tables 11 and 12 in the appendix). 57, 203 observations from 9, 277 female persons and 57, 419
observations from 8, 847 male individuals. Except for health satisfaction in columns (1)-(4) and doctor visits in
columns (5) and (6), probabilities are accounted at the mean values of all covariates. The state of health is defined
as: poor (cat. 0− 4), medium (cat. 5− 6), and good (cat. 7− 8), and excellent (cat. 9− 10) health.
The male probit estimates show the probability difference between healthy and
unhealthy individuals to vary between 1 percentage point when the pooled probit
estimator is considered and 0.5 percentage points when controlling for the interac-
tion between individual effects and the health variable. In the linear specifications,
the corresponding values (columns (1) and (2)) are around 13 and 4 percentage
points, respectively. Finally, allowing for the endogeneity of health satisfaction
expands the probability gap to 22 and 16 percentage points, respectively.
Results for most of the other variables are as expected (see tables 11 and 12 in
the appendix). For both women and men the participation probability increases
with age (at a decreasing rate) and education.17 Living in the eastern part of Ger-
many is associated with lower participation for men, while the effect is positive for
women (the female population in the eastern region also has a higher participa-
tion probability than their western counterparts, probably rooted in the socialist
past). Being of non-German origin and the amount of non labor income has a
negative influence on the probability of labor market participation. An increasing
labor market attachment of the partner tends to reduce the probability to work for
women and has a tendency to increase the participation probability in the male
population, yet some of the partner and children variables exhibit the same sign for
women and men, which means that the effects remain somewhat ambiguous overall.
For both sexes, the number of children in different age categories mostly reduce
the individuals’ labor market attachment and the partner’s net wage is associated
with a decreasing working probability in most specifications for both females and
males.
17For women, in some of the linear specifications the probability to work decreases with age.
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5.2 Wage Equations
Since the core interest of this study is the estimation of the wage equation (eq. 3),
results for six different estimation methods are given in tables 3 and 4. Columns
(1) through (3) in each table display results for OLS, FE and Wooldridge’s (1995)
estimator, all of which assume health to be exogenously determined. In both
tables, endogeneity of health is allowed for in the pooled 2SLS (4) and FE-2SLS
(5) specifications as well as in Semykina and Wooldridge’s (2006) estimator (6).
The Instruments. For specifications (4) through (6) the set of instruments con-
sists of all eleven variables which serve as exclusion restrictions in the participation
equations (including “doctor visits”, see section 5.1). To check the rank conditions
on the 2SLS estimators, F-tests on the joint-significance of the instruments in the
first step regressions are conducted. For both women and men and for all economet-
ric models the null hypotheses are rejected at any sensible level. Overidentification
tests strongly reject the null hypotheses of no correlation between the instruments
and the error of the wage equation for both sexes in the pooled IV and FE-2SLS
estimations (columns (4) and (6)). When testing for overidentifying restrictions in
Semykina’s and Wooldridge’s (2006) framework, however, no correlation between
the instruments and the error in the wage equation is detected. This is in line
with Semykina (2007), who shows that if instruments enter the selection equation,
“[...] they will be inevitably correlated with [...],” the error term of the selected
sample. Consequently, if a selection bias exists – which is the case here (see table
2) – overidentification tests will detect endogeneity of the exclusion restrictions.
Thus, rejecting the null hypothesis in the pooled IV and FE-2SLS approach is just
another way of stating that selection bias is present.
The Selection Effects. A preliminary check for the presence of selection bias
can be carried out by Wald tests on the joint significance of the Inverse Mills
Ratios (table 2). In columns (1) and (2) we follow Wooldridge (1995) and conduct
“variable addition” tests, as first proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992). It
is assumed that no further endogeneity problems occur and under the null the
standard within estimator is valid. In columns (3) and (4) tests in the spirit of
Semykina andWooldridge (2006) are carried out, where the null hypothesis suggests
to use the FE-2SLS estimator. For women and men alike the null hypothesis is
strongly rejected and this evidence of selection bias in both the FE and the FE-
2SLS framework indicates that use of the methods introduced in section 3 is in
order.18
Health and Wages. While good health significantly increases participation for
both men and women, the impact of health on the wage rate differs quite a bit
18For both women and men, the inverse Mills ratios are negatively correlated with wages in
most years (coefficients not reported). Since the IMRs are inversely related to the estimated
probabilities of being employed, the negative coefficients indicate that a higher participation
probability is associated with an above average salary.
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Table 2: IMR Tests, Women and Men, 1995-2006
Withina) FE-2SLSb)
Male Female Male Female
Wald-test, χ212 = 139.80 44.52 131.68 44.11
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 47,746 37,670 47,746 37,670
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. Within and FE-2SLS estimation. Robust p-values are reported
under the test statistics. a) Wald tests on the joint significance of the IMRs are provided. It is assumed that there
are no further endogeneity problems. Under the null hypothesis the within estimators are valid. b) Wald tests on
the joint significance of the IMRs are provided. Under the null hypothesis the FE-2SLS estimators are valid.
across genders. For males (table 3), the parameter of the health variable using
pooled OLS (0.041) is higher than the coefficient in the fixed effects model (0.013).
Both effects are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Controlling for
selection lowers the significance level to 5% and reduces the coefficient even further
(0.011), but the differences between the FE and the Wooldridge (1995) estimator
are practically small. This suggests that using the FE estimator already accounts
for most of the bias introduced by the correlation between the health variable and
unobserved individual heterogeneity. Turning to the 2SLS models, a comparison
of the parameters shows that the coefficients of health satisfaction in columns (1),
(2), and (3) are smaller than their 2SLS counterparts in columns (4), (5), and (6)
which is to be expected if self-assessed health is error-ridden. Within the instru-
mental variable framework, the (significantly estimated) parameters again exhibit
substantial differences. Using pooled 2SLS is associated with a coefficient of 0.046,
whereas implementing FE-2SLS yields the highest parameter of 0.062. Though less
precisely estimated, controlling for selection scales the health coefficient down to
0.041. For the Mundlak-type estimators in columns (3) and (6), a Wald of the joint
significance of the unobserved individual effects is carried out and in both cases
indicates correlated individual effects. Selection tests, where now the assumptions
under the null hypothesis are more restrictive than those underlying the tests in
table 2 again reject the null of no selection effects in columns (3) and (6). Finally,
endogeneity tests show systematic differences between the health coefficients in
columns (2) and (5).
The same six econometric models using the female sample are presented in table
4. The results, however, are less intuitive than in the male sample. As with men,
selection corrections are indicated by Wald tests on the joint significance of the
IMRs for the models in columns (3) and (6). In these specifications Wald tests
confirm the presence of correlated individual effects just as in the male sample,
whereas endogeneity tests suggest that the health variable is exogenous in columns
(1), (2), and (3). Throughout all specifications, only pooled OLS points to a
significant effect of health for females. Therefore, summarizing the above, it seems
that for women health has only a negligible effect on wages (intensive margin),
though there exists a significant effect on labour market participation (extensive
level).
In an attempt to give an idea of the economic significance of the above results
and in order to facilitate comparison of the various estimators, table 5 provides
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Table 3: Wage equations, Men, 1995-2006
OLSa) Withina) Wooldr95c) 2SLSb) FE-2SLSb) SemWool06d)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log. health sat. 0.041 0.013 0.011 0.046 0.062 0.041
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.024)∗
Age 0.083 . . 0.083 . .
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
Age sqare -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0003)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0003)∗∗∗
Age triple 1.00e-05 1.00e-05 1.00e-05 1.00e-05 1.00e-05 1.00e-05
(1.29e-06)∗∗∗ (1.72e-06)∗∗∗ (2.21e-06)∗∗∗ (1.29e-06)∗∗∗ (1.73e-06)∗∗∗ (2.22e-06)∗∗∗
Unempl. exp. -.047 -.105 -.096 -.047 -.106 -.097
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗
Unempl. exp. sq. 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.0004)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗ (0.003) (0.0004)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗ (0.003)
Firm tenure 0.014 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.005 0.005
(0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
Firm tenure sq. -.0002 -.0001 -.0001 -.0002 -.0001 -.0001
(1.00e-05)∗∗∗ (0.00002)∗∗∗ (0.00003)∗∗∗ (1.00e-05)∗∗∗ (0.00002)∗∗∗ (0.00003)∗∗∗
Education 0.034 . . 0.034 . .
(0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗
Du. education -.023 -.006 -.003 -.023 -.006 -.003
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004) (0.005)
Part-time -.115 -.038 -.025 -.115 -.036 -.025
(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.022) (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.019)∗ (0.022)
Foreigner -.002 . . -.002 . .
(0.005) (0.005)
State level variables
Log. unempl. (fed. st.) -.115 -.017 -.005 -.115 -.015 -.005
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.017) (0.021) (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.017) (0.021)
Log. vac. (fed. st.) -.040 -.003 -.004 -.040 -.002 -.004
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.007) (0.009)
Log. empl. (fed. st.) 0.171 0.025 0.017 0.171 0.023 0.018
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.018) (0.023) (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.018) (0.023)
East Germany -.221 -.041 -.037 -.221 -.041 -.037
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗
Number of children
≤ 2 years of age 0.036 0.013 0.01 0.036 0.013 0.01
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.006)∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗
3− 5 years of age 0.036 0.018 0.015 0.036 0.019 0.015
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
6− 16 years of age 0.013 0.002 0.0006 0.013 0.002 0.0009
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.004)
Du. num. child. -.018 -.008 -.008 -.017 -.007 -.008
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.007)
Firm size (base cat.: < 20 employees
20− 199 0.087 0.046 0.036 0.087 0.045 0.036
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
200− 1, 999 0.153 0.059 0.047 0.153 0.058 0.047
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
≥ 2000 0.192 0.067 0.055 0.192 0.066 0.054
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Firm size miss. 0.08 0.022 0.037 0.08 0.021 0.038
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.017) (0.019)∗ (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.017) (0.019)∗∗
Constant -.146 . . -.159 . .
(0.106) (0.113)
N 47,746 47,746 47,746 47,746 47,746 47,746
D.f. 47,695 40,020 47,651 47,695 40,020 47,641
Wald tests on the joint significance of
12 IMRs . . 83.04∗∗∗ . . 64.21∗∗∗
11 time dummies 349.62∗∗∗ 266.15∗∗∗ 138.27∗∗∗ 349.71∗∗∗ 265.53∗∗∗ 137.37∗∗∗
6 occ. dummies 2709.41∗∗∗ 17.80∗∗∗ 728.22∗∗∗ 2685.21∗∗∗ 17.97∗∗∗ 687.12∗∗∗
9 sector dummies 1369.84∗∗∗ 65.81∗∗∗ 398.07∗∗∗ 1372.60∗∗∗ 66.01∗∗∗ 405.00∗∗∗
Unobs. effectse . . 1080.87∗∗∗ . . 1146.49∗∗∗
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. Standard errors in parenthesis: * significance at ten, ** at five, and *** at one
percent. Year, sector, and occupation dummies are included, but not reported. a) Standard errors are are robust to serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity; b) robust standard errors as in a), but the 2SLS estimator is used and accounted for; c) robust
standard errors as in a), but the variation introduced by the probit first-stage estimation is accounted for; d) robust standard
errors as in c), but the 2SLS estimator is used and accounted for; e) χ2 test statistics for the joint significance of 35 variables
(vector x¯i) or 45 variables (vector q¯i) are reported.
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Table 4: Wage equations, Women, 1995-2006
OLSa) Withina) Wooldr95c) 2SLSb) FE-2SLSb) SemWool06d)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log. health sat. 0.023 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.03 0.007
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024)
Age 0.08 . . 0.08 . .
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Age sqare -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0003)∗∗∗ (0.0003)∗∗∗ (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.0003)∗∗∗ (0.0004)∗∗∗
Age triple 9.57e-06 1.00e-05 1.00e-05 9.59e-06 1.00e-05 1.00e-05
(1.60e-06)∗∗∗ (2.25e-06)∗∗∗ (2.69e-06)∗∗∗ (1.60e-06)∗∗∗ (2.25e-06)∗∗∗ (2.85e-06)∗∗∗
Unempl. exp. -.029 -.091 -.088 -.030 -.091 -.088
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗
Unempl. exp. sq. 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.004) (0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.004)
Firm tenure 0.016 0.003 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.003
(0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗ (0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗
Firm tenure sq. -.0002 -.00007 -.00009 -.0002 -.00007 -.00009
(0.00002)∗∗∗ (0.00003)∗∗ (0.00004)∗∗ (0.00002)∗∗∗ (0.00003)∗∗ (0.00004)∗∗
Education 0.042 . . 0.042 . .
(0.0009)∗∗∗ (0.0009)∗∗∗
Du. education -.030 -.013 -.010 -.030 -.012 -.010
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗ (0.008) (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗ (0.008)
Part-time -.047 0.018 0.025 -.047 0.018 0.025
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Foreigner 0.014 . . 0.014 . .
(0.006)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗
State level variables
Log. unempl. (fed. st.) -.101 0.0008 0.018 -.101 0.002 0.017
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.018) (0.023) (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.018) (0.024)
Log. vac. (fed. st.) -.041 -.003 0.002 -.040 -.003 0.002
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.01) (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.012)
Log. empl. (fed. st.) 0.133 0.031 0.005 0.132 0.031 0.006
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.022) (0.029) (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.022) (0.03)
East Germany -.190 -.039 -.037 -.191 -.039 -.037
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗
Number of children
≤ 2 years of age 0.047 -.013 0.031 0.047 -.013 0.031
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.017) (0.021) (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.017) (0.022)
3− 5 years of age 0.025 -.009 0.015 0.024 -.008 0.014
(0.009)∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.013) (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.014)
6− 16 years of age -.006 -.012 -.004 -.006 -.012 -.004
(0.005) (0.007)∗ (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)∗ (0.009)
Du. num. child. -.011 0.008 0.007 -.011 0.008 0.007
(0.008) (0.01) (0.012) (0.008) (0.01) (0.013)
Firm size (base cat.: < 20 employees
20− 199 0.088 0.031 0.026 0.088 0.031 0.026
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
200− 1, 999 0.139 0.052 0.044 0.138 0.052 0.044
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
≥ 2000 0.177 0.055 0.04 0.177 0.054 0.04
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Firm size miss. 0.102 0.04 0.071 0.102 0.039 0.072
(0.02)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗
Constant 0.08 . . 0.122 . .
(0.12) (0.125)
N 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670
D.f. 37,619 31,063 37,575 37,619 31,063 37,565
Wald tests on the joint significance of
12 IMRs . . 53.52∗∗∗ . . 44.50∗∗∗
11 time dummies 142.69∗∗∗ 203.37∗∗∗ 110.07∗∗∗ 143.24∗∗∗ 203.97∗∗∗ 96.64∗∗∗
6 occ. dummies 2293.65∗∗∗ 23.41∗∗∗ 705.71∗∗∗ 2292.66∗∗∗ 23.37∗∗∗ 664.39∗∗∗
9 sector dummies 537.381∗∗∗ 25.40∗∗∗ 162.58∗∗∗ 538.35∗∗∗ 25.45∗∗∗ 162.13∗∗∗
Unobs. effectse . . 985.57∗∗∗ . . 1024.72∗∗∗
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. Standard errors in parenthesis: * significance at ten, ** at five, and *** at one
percent. Year, sector, and occupation dummies are included, but not reported. a) Standard errors are are robust to serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity; b) robust standard errors as in a), but the 2SLS estimator is used and accounted for; c) robust
standard errors as in a), but the variation introduced by the probit first-stage estimation is accounted for; d) robust standard
errors as in c), but the 2SLS estimator is used and accounted for; e) χ2 test statistics for the joint significance of 35 variables
(vector x¯i) or 45 variables (vector q¯i) are reported.
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predicted wages of four “average” individuals, who differ only in their state of
health.19 For a male in excellent health, pooled OLS predicts real wages to be
about 5% (0.62 Euro) higher than for a male person suffering from poor health.20
Accounting for individual heterogeneity in column (2) reduces the wage gap to
about 0.19 Euro or 1.5%. Whenever non-random selection into the work force
(Wooldr95 ) is additionally considered, hourly wages decline on each health level
and the wage differential in column (3) shrinks to 1.3 percentage points (0.15 Euro)
when compared to the within estimator. Predictions are slightly different when
implementing instrumental variable techniques. The wage gap between individuals
who are highly satisfied with their health status and those suffering from poor
health is about 0.69 Euro (5.7%) in column (4) and 0.90 Euro (7.8%) in column
(5). Again, wages are reduced in each health group whenever sample selection is
accounted for. Here, the wage premium for being in excellent health is estimated
to be around 0.56 Euro (5.1%).
Table 5: Wage Predictions (per hour), by different Health Groups,
Women and Men, 1995-2006
Men
OLS Within Wooldr95 TSLS FETSLS Wooldr05
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poor health 12.137 12.115 11.162 12.086 11.612 10.967
Medium health 12.475 12.218 11.246 12.463 12.104 11.274
Good health 12.641 12.268 11.286 12.650 12.350 11.425
Excellent health 12.752 12.301 11.313 12.774 12.514 11.526
Women
OLS Within Wooldr95 TSLS FETSLS Wooldr05
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poor health 9.870 8.882 5.779 9.993 8.712 5.782
Medium health 10.020 8.925 5.799 10.045 8.891 5.811
Good health 10.095 8.947 5.809 10.071 8.980 5.826
Excellent health 10.144 8.960 5.815 10.088 9.038 5.835
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. Predicted hourly wages (in Euros, deflated to unity at year end 2001)
based on different wage equations (see tables 3 and 4). 47, 746 observations from 7, 679 male persons and 37, 670
observations from 6, 560 female individuals. Except for health satisfaction and the IMRs, wages are accounted at
the mean values of all explanatory variables. The state of health is defined as: poor (cat. 0 − 4), medium (cat.
5− 6), and good (cat. 7− 8), and excellent (cat. 9− 10) health.
The differences in real hourly wages between healthy and unhealthy females
range from 0.6% to 3.7%, conditional on the method of estimation. Since all
estimators with the exception of pooled OLS lack sufficient precision, simulation
results in the female sample must be interpreted with caution. Keeping this in
19Since the individuals’ health status also affects the probability of participating, we calculate
“mean” IMRs (over time and person), which differ with respect to the corresponding health
groups. Hence, the simulations in table 5 are based on mean values of all explanatory variables
in the wage equations except for health satisfaction and doctor visits, respectively, as well as the
inverse Mills ratios.
20In order to obtain hourly wages we exponentiate predicted log wages. This procedure differs
somewhat from the one proposed by Kennedy (1984). However, we conduct sensitivity tests
based on the pooled OLS estimates and find the differences between Kennedy’s method and our
predictions negligible.
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mind, the decline in wages induced by accounting for non-random selection into
work (columns (3) and (6)) is fairly strong in the female sample. This finding is
rooted in the fact that integrating the large share of non-participating females into
the workforce would drastically reduce average wages.
Other Results. Aside from our main interest in the effect of health on wages,
concave wage profiles are found with respect to firm tenure in all specifications
and for women and men. Given the high unemployment rates in Germany, it
is of practical relevance to see that in all models past unemployment periods go
with significantly lower wages (at an increasing rate), whereas education positively
affects participation and comes with a rate of return per additional year of schooling
of 4.2% for women and approximately 3.4% for men.
Results for most of the other variables are as expected. For both women and
men wages increase at a decreasing rate with age. Working in the eastern part
of Germany or being in part-time employment reduces salaries. In the pooled
specifications in columns (1) and (4), a larger average number of job seekers in
the federal sate negatively influences wages, whereas an increase in the number of
employed raises the wage rate. Women and men working in large firms (≥ 2000
employees) earn significantly more than in medium-sized firms, which in turn earn
more than males and females employed in small firms. These effects persist when
controlling for individual heterogeneity and selection, albeit smaller in magnitude.
The number of children (especially 0 to 5 year olds) is associated with higher
wages in the male sample, whereas results in the female sample are insignificant
in most specifications. Finally, as for the structural factors affecting wages, we
find industry and occupational wage differentials as in all models and irrespective
of gender. Wald tests confirm the joint significance of six occupational and nine
sector dummies at any sensible level.
6 Conclusions
In this article, we employ recently developed estimation methods by Semykina and
Wooldridge (2006) in order to control for selection, individual heterogeneity and
endogeneity in one comprehensive framework and apply them to the question of
whether health has a causal effect on wages. A number of tests provide evidence
that corrections for non-random selection into the workforce are necessary in both
the female and male sample and the health variable is found to suffer from mea-
surement error. Our results show that good health raises wages for men, while for
women there appears to be no significant effect. The fact that predicted partic-
ipation probabilities in the probit models are more contingent on health for the
average woman than they are for the average man is in line with this finding, pro-
viding tentative evidence that for females health may mainly affect participation,
while for males the effect is essentially to be found on the intensive margin.
A question for further research that immediately comes to mind is whether
investment in improved health status is worthwhile at the micro or macro level.
While monetary gains from being in good health are calculated in table 5, these
results are not very informative from a welfare point of view, which must take
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into account individual utility gains and adequate cost measures. Another task for
future research could be the estimation of an “all-encompassing” model which takes
into account all sources of endogeneity mentioned in this article and additionally
tries to address dynamic effects in the state of health.
Appendix
Table 6: Description of Variables (part i)
Variable Description
Probit dummy variable indicating participation in the labour
market (probit = 1) or no participation (probit = 0)
Log. hourly wage log. earnings per hour (deflated to 2001 Euros)
Health satisfaction variable indicating current health satisfaction of an
individual; categories range from 0− 10;
transformation: f(hi,t) = log(hi,t +
√
(h2i,t + 1))
Age age in years
Education amount of education or training in years
Dummy education whenever years of education or training
decrease over time, the lower values
are changed to the former maximum and the
dummy education variable is set to 1
Unemployment experience duration of unemployment in a person’s career;
in years, with months in decimal form
Firm tenure duration of time with firm;
in years, with months in decimal form
Log. non labour income log. household income minus
net wage income (in 2001 Euros)
No. of doctor visits number of doctor visits in the last three months
Part-time dummy variable indicating part-time work
Foreigner dummy variable indicating non-German nationality
Firm size four dummy variables indicating different firm sizes;
categories: up to 20 employees ; 20− 199 employees;
200− 1999 employees; larger than 2000 employees
Occupation seven occupation dummies, constructed using the
Erikson, Goldthorpe Class Category IS88 (basis: high serv.)
(continued)
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Table 7: Description of Variables (part ii)
Variable Description
Sector ten aggregated sector dummies, based on
the NACE classification (basis: agric., forestry, fishing)
Time eleven time dummies (1996 - 2006) (basis: 1995)
State level variables
Log unemploymenta (log) yearly averages of job seekers
in the individual state of residence
Log vacancies (log) yearly average of notified vacancies (per state)
Log employed (log) yearly average of employed persons (per state)
Dummy East Germany dummy variables indicating where a person
lives (probit equ.) or works (wage equ.);
Region = 0 if Western Germany
Parent variables
Number of childrenb no. of children in three categories; 1) up to 2 years old;
2) between 3 - 5 years old; 3) between 6 - 16 years old
Dummy no. of children dummy variable indicating the presence of children
under the age of 17
(du. num. child. = 1 if no children present)
Partner or Spouse variablesc
Single dummy variable indicating whether a person
has a partner/is married
(single = 1 if person has no partner)
Flag missing dummy variable indicating missing data
on partner/spouse variables
(du. flag miss. = 1 if partner present but data missing)
Net wage net wage of partner or spouse
Age age in years of partner or spouse
Experience labour market experience of partner/spouse
Education amount of education or training in years of partner/spouse
aUnemployment, vacancy, and employment figures are provided by the Federal Employment
Agency, Nuremberg.
bAll children variables equal zero, if dummy no. child. = 1.
cAll partner/spouse variables equal zero, if single = 1 or flag miss. = 1.
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Table 9: Frequency Distribution, Health Satisfaction
Overall Sample Male Sample Female Sample
Abs. in % Abs. in % Abs. in %
Cat. 0 814 .71 371 .65 443 .77
Cat. 1 769 .67 371 .65 398 .70
Cat. 2 2,351 2.05 1,155 2.01 1,196 2.09
Cat. 3 4,828 4.21 2,372 4.13 2,456 4.29
Cat. 4 6,004 5.24 2,898 5.05 3,106 5.43
Cat. 5 14,718 12.84 6,840 11.91 7,878 13.77
Cat. 6 12,053 10.52 6,093 10.61 5,960 10.42
Cat. 7 21,008 18.33 10,776 18.77 10,232 17.89
Cat. 8 29,600 25.82 15,004 26.13 14,596 25.52
Cat. 9 13,767 12.01 7,038 12.26 6729 11.76
Cat. 10 8,710 7.60 4,501 7.84 4,209 7.36
All 114,622 100.00 57,419 100.00 57,203 100.00
Data: GSOEP, samples A-F, 1995-2006. Observations are on individual-year level.
Table 10: Different Functional Forms of the Health Variable
Male Sample
Wage Equ. Part. Equ.
Spec. (1) Spec. (2) Spec. (3) Spec. (4) Spec. (5) Spec. (6)
Lin. health sat. .008 . . .019 . .
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗
Log. health sat. . .041 . . .109 .
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Medium health . . .003 . . .080
(.005) (.005)∗∗∗
Good health . . .033 . . .115
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Excell. health . . .039 . . .113
(.006)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
N 47,746 47,746 47,746 57,419 57,419 57,419
Female Sample
Wage Equ. Part. Equ.
Spec. (1) Spec. (2) Spec. (3) Spec. (4) Spec. (5) Spec. (6)
Lin. health sat. .005 . . .015 . .
(.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗
Log. health sat. . .023 . . .087 .
(.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Medium health . . -.012 . . .073
(.006)∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Good health . . .013 . . .094
(.006)∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Excell. health . . .017 . . .095
(.007)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
N 37,670 37,670 37,670 57,203 57,203 57,203
Data: GSOEP, samples A-F, 1995-2006. All specifications (including the linear probability models in columns
(4), (5), and (6)) are estimated using pooled OLS. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis: * significance at
ten, ** at five, and *** at one percent. The state of health in columns (3) and (6) is defined as: poor (cat. 0− 4),
medium (cat. 5 − 6), good (cat. 7 − 8), and excellent (cat. 9 − 10). Further explanatory variables are included
(see tables 3, 4 and 11, 12), but not reported.
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Table 11: Participation Equation, Men, 1995-2006
OLSa) Withina) 2SLSa),b) FE-2SLSa),b) Probitc) Mundlak Pr.c),d)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age .029 . .030 . .166 .
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗
Age square -.0005 .0005 -.0005 .0005 -.004 -.001
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)
Age triple 1.36e-06 -7.46e-06 1.23e-06 -7.77e-06 .00002 -3.36e-06
(1.20e-06) (1.72e-06)∗∗∗ (1.20e-06) (1.73e-06)∗∗∗ (9.30e-06)∗∗ (1.00e-05)
Education .015 . .014 . .109 .
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Dummy Education -.005 -.012 -.004 -.012 -.066 -.049
(.004) (.004)∗∗∗ (.004) (.004)∗∗∗ (.034)∗ (.034)
Foreigner -.042 . -.043 . -.224 .
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.052)∗∗∗
Lg. health sat. .109 .032 .178 .133 . .
(.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
Doctor visits . . . . -.028 -.013
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Lg. non-lab.-inc. -.036 -.033 -.036 -.033 -.362 -.367
(.0004)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗
State level variables
Lg. unempl. (fed. st.) a -.069 -.095 -.068 -.092 -.438 -.447
(.005)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.067)∗∗∗ (.117)∗∗∗
Lg. vac. (fed. st.) .008 -.021 .006 -.021 .078 -.064
(.007) (.008)∗∗∗ (.007) (.008)∗∗∗ (.052) (.051)
Lg. empl. (fed. st.) .060 .101 .060 .096 .353 .353
(.009)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.088)∗∗∗ (.144)∗∗
East Germany -.028 -.013 -.027 -.016 -.178 -.151
(.006)∗∗∗ (.022) (.006)∗∗∗ (.022) (.065)∗∗∗ (.161)
Number of children
≤ 2 years of age .003 .012 .001 .011 .062 .061
(.005) (.006)∗∗ (.005) (.006)∗ (.045) (.044)
3− 5 years of age -.010 .005 -.010 .005 -.053 .005
(.004)∗∗ (.005) (.004)∗∗ (.005) (.038) (.039)
6− 16 years of age -.016 -.009 -.017 -.008 -.075 -.049
(.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.030)∗
Du. num. child. -.066 -.011 -.064 -.010 -.216 .010
(.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.006) (.055)∗∗∗ (.048)
Partner/Spouse variables
Single .708 .040 .689 .026 4.420 1.196
(.052)∗∗∗ (.061) (.052)∗∗∗ (.062) (.489)∗∗∗ (1.038)
Net wage partner/spouse -.00002 -.00005 -.00002 -.00005 -.0002 -.0004
(3.17e-06)∗∗∗ (4.63e-06)∗∗∗ (3.18e-06)∗∗∗ (4.69e-06)∗∗∗ (.00003)∗∗∗ (.00005)∗∗∗
Age partner/spouse .019 .013 .019 .013 .135 .093
(.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗
Age sq. partner/spouse -.0002 -.0001 -.0002 -.0001 -.001 -.0009
(.00002)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.00002)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0003)∗∗∗
Exp. partner/spouse -.0007 -.004 -.0009 -.004 -.002 -.012
(.0006) (.002)∗∗ (.0006) (.002)∗∗ (.007) (.014)
Exp. sq. partner/spouse -.00003 .00009 -.00002 .00009 -.0002 .0002
(.00002) (.00005)∗ (.00002) (.00005)∗ (.0002) (.0004)
Educ. partner/spouse .060 -.021 .058 -.023 .279 -.044
(.006)∗∗∗ (.011)∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗ (.060)∗∗∗ (.152)
Educ. sq. partner/spouse -.002 .0005 -.002 .0006 -.010 -.0003
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0004) (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0004) (.002)∗∗∗ (.006)
Du. flag miss. .847 .136 .827 .122 5.196 1.633
(.054)∗∗∗ (.060)∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.061)∗∗ (.504)∗∗∗ (1.039)
Constant -.633 . -.819 . -4.305 .
(.111)∗∗∗ (.114)∗∗∗ (.912)∗∗∗
Time dummies χ211 = 40.7
∗∗∗ 25.74∗∗∗ 41.704∗∗∗ 24.954∗∗∗ 30.269∗∗∗ 17.273∗
Unobs. effects χ236 = . . . . . 451.32
∗∗∗
LL . . . . -16958.95 -16718.69
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. Different binary choice specifications. 57, 419 observations from 8, 847 individuals.
Standard errors in parenthesis: * significance at ten, ** at five, and *** at one percent. Year dummies are included in each procedure
but not reported. a) robust standard errors are provided; b) t-tests on the significance of the instrument in the 1st step regressions
confirm that the rank condition for identification of the IV estimators is fulfilled; heteroskedasticity robust, regression based Hausman
tests provide evidence for the endogeneity of the health variable on the 1% significance level.c) Standard errors are robust to serial
correlation in the individual scores across t; d) unobserved effects are specified as a linear projection on the (within) means of the
regressors.
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Table 12: Participation Equation, Women, 1995-2006
OLSa) Withina) 2SLSa),b) FE-2SLSa),b) Probitc) Mundlak Pr.c),d)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age -.010 . -.009 . .097 .
(.006) (.006) (.041)∗∗
Age square .0007 .0001 .0007 .0002 -.0009 -.002
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002) (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002) (.001) (.001)
Age triple -1.00e-05 -4.98e-06 -1.00e-05 -5.33e-06 -8.06e-06 -6.01e-07
(1.26e-06)∗∗∗ (1.67e-06)∗∗∗ (1.26e-06)∗∗∗ (1.69e-06)∗∗∗ (8.00e-06) (7.87e-06)
Education .026 . .024 . .103 .
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗
Dummy Education .002 .006 .005 .006 -.015 .020
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.032) (.025)
Foreigner -.094 . -.093 . -.289 .
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗
Lg. health sat. .087 .017 .176 .156 . .
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗
Doctor visits . . . . -.021 -.011
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Lg. non-lab.-inc. -.032 -.024 -.032 -.023 -.145 -.112
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
State level variables
Lg. unempl. (fed. st.) a -.088 -.085 -.088 -.084 -.322 -.323
(.007)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗ (.092)∗∗∗
Lg. vac. (fed. st.) -.048 -.034 -.051 -.034 -.173 -.137
(.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.051)∗∗∗ (.038)∗∗∗
Lg. empl. (fed. st.) .120 .153 .123 .157 .439 .604
(.012)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.080)∗∗∗ (.117)∗∗∗
East Germany .048 .023 .051 .025 .125 .064
(.008)∗∗∗ (.030) (.008)∗∗∗ (.030) (.058)∗∗ (.165)
Number of children
≤ 2 years of age -.317 -.203 -.319 -.204 -.981 -.641
(.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
3− 5 years of age -.221 -.116 -.221 -.114 -.677 -.359
(.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗
6− 16 years of age -.105 -.030 -.106 -.030 -.315 -.100
(.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗
Du. num. child. -.050 -.001 -.050 -.001 -.051 .031
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008) (.007)∗∗∗ (.008) (.044) (.034)
Partner/Spouse variables
Single .261 -.038 .270 -.038 .466 -.101
(.075)∗∗∗ (.136) (.077)∗∗∗ (.137) (.437) (.402)
Net wage partner/spouse -.00005 -.00003 -.00005 -.00003 -.0002 -.0001
(2.79e-06)∗∗∗ (2.85e-06)∗∗∗ (2.85e-06)∗∗∗ (2.92e-06)∗∗∗ (.00002)∗∗∗ (1.00e-05)∗∗∗
Age partner/spouse .006 .005 .007 .007 .009 .014
(.002)∗∗ (.004) (.002)∗∗∗ (.004) (.015) (.017)
Age sq. partner/spouse -.0001 8.58e-06 -.0001 -9.99e-06 -.0002 .00009
(.00002)∗∗∗ (.00004) (.00003)∗∗∗ (.00004) (.0002) (.0002)
Exp. partner/spouse .005 -.003 .005 -.003 .014 -.012
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002) (.001)∗∗∗ (.002) (.009) (.011)
Exp. sq. partner/spouse -.0001 -.00003 -.0001 -.00003 -.0003 -.0001
(.00002)∗∗∗ (.00004) (.00002)∗∗∗ (.00004) (.0002)∗ (.0002)
Educ. partner/spouse .021 -.024 .019 -.029 .037 -.071
(.008)∗∗∗ (.017) (.008)∗∗ (.017)∗ (.054) (.061)
Educ. sq. partner/spouse -.0006 .0006 -.0006 .0009 -.001 .002
(.0003)∗∗ (.0006) (.0003)∗∗ (.0006) (.002) (.002)
Du. flag miss. .291 -.015 .298 -.016 .519 -.063
(.076)∗∗∗ (.137) (.077)∗∗∗ (.138) (.441) (.404)
Constant .010 . -.253 . -2.051 .
(.128) (.133)∗ . (.794)
∗∗∗
Time dummies χ211 = 169.007
∗∗∗ 25.96∗∗∗ 59.867∗∗∗ 59.595∗∗∗ 99.211∗∗∗ 43.765∗∗∗
Unobs. effects χ236 = . . . . . 691.46
∗∗∗
LL . . . . -28309.25 -27964.73
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. Different binary choice specifications. 57, 203 observations from 9, 277 persons. Standard
errors in parenthesis: * significance at ten, ** at five, and *** at one percent. Year dummies are included in each procedure but not
reported. a) robust standard errors are provided; b) t-tests on the significance of the instrument in the 1st step regressions confirm that
the rank condition for identification of the IV estimators is fulfilled; heteroskedasticity robust, regression based Hausman tests provide
evidence for the endogeneity of the health variable on the 1% significance level.c) Standard errors are robust to serial correlation in
the individual scores across t; d) unobserved effects are specified as a linear projection on the (within) means of the regressors.
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Table 13: Summary, Participation Equation, Men, 1995-2006
Entire Sample Probit = 0 Probit = 1
Probit .860 0 1
(.347) (0) (0)
Age 41.481 43.022 41.231
(10.939) (13.452) (10.453)
Age square 1840.336 2031.813 1809.240
(927.205) (1132.517) (885.515)
Age triple 86389.600 102508.200 83771.970
(62600.990) (76750.590) (59579.680)
Education 12.192 11.192 12.354
(2.606) (2.158) (2.636)
Dummy Education .145 .162 .143
(.353) (.369) (.350)
Foreigner .128 .189 .118
(.334) (.392) (.323)
Doctor visits 1.892 2.732 1.755
(3.694) (5.115) (3.388)
Lg. health sat. 2.567 2.400 2.594
(.411) (.581) (.370)
Lg. non-lab.-inc. 5.713 7.712 5.388
(2.881) (1.140) (2.946)
State level variables
Lg. unempl. (fed. state) 12.797 12.755 12.804
(.550) (.547) (.550)
Lg. vac. (fed. state) 10.459 10.258 10.491
(.822) (.865) (.810)
Lg. empl. (fed. state) 14.689 14.512 14.718
(.740) (.784) (.729)
Du. East-Germany .257 .386 .237
(.437) (.487) (.425)
Number of children
up to 2 years old .081 .052 .086
(.287) (.233) (.295)
between 3− 5 .117 .073 .124
(.350) (.287) (.359)
between 6− 16 .475 .338 .497
(.813) (.738) (.822)
Du. no. child. .601 .737 .579
(.490) (.440) (.494)
Partner/Spouse variablesa)
Single .225 .334 .207
(.417) (.472) (.405)
Net wage partner/spouse 587.805 499.016 600.032
(638.363) (653.367) (635.307)
Age partner/spouse 40.912 44.535 40.413
(10.068) (11.591) (9.735)
Age sq. partner/spouse 1775.179 2117.684 1728.013
(850.881) (1007.411) (815.836)
Exp. partner/spouse 10.565 13.017 10.227
(9.156) (11.176) (8.788)
Exp. sq. partner/spouse 195.440 294.326 181.823
(298.963) (393.187) (280.838)
Educ. partner/spouse 11.902 11.181 12.001
(2.418) (2.330) (2.413)
Educ sq. partner/spouse 147.499 130.442 149.848
(63.827) (57.959) (64.240)
Du. flag miss. .025 .015 .026
(.156) (.123) (.160)
N 57,419 8,022 49,397
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. All summary statistics are on individual-year level. Standard errors
are in parenthesis.
a) The reported sample statistics for these variables are conditional on non-missing data (Du. flag miss. = 0) and
having a partner/being married (Single = 0).
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Table 14: Summary, Participation Equation, Women, 1995-2006
Entire Sample Probit = 0 Probit = 1
Probit .688 0 1
(.463) (0) (0)
Age 41.714 43.930 40.708
(11.026) (11.973) (10.413)
Age square 1861.637 2073.182 1765.550
(933.362) (1049.170) (858.688)
Age triple 87851.120 103525.300 80731.660
(63049.890) (73259.050) (56400.720)
Education 11.926 11.099 12.302
(2.467) (2.209) (2.486)
Dummy Education .131 .136 .129
(.337) (.342) (.335)
Foreigner .124 .195 .091
(.329) (.396) (.288)
Doctor visits 2.575 3.013 2.375
(4.013) (4.844) (3.554)
Lg. health sat. 2.549 2.482 2.579
(.425) (.499) (.384)
Lg. non-lab.-inc. 5.870 6.997 5.358
(2.842) (1.923) (3.038)
State level variables
Lg. unempl. (fed. state) 12.801 12.841 12.783
(.558) (.569) (.553)
Lg. vac. (fed. state) 10.459 10.541 10.422
(.823) (.792) (.835)
Lg. empl. (fed. state) 14.692 14.766 14.658
(.742) (.724) (.748)
Du. East-Germany .252 .202 .275
(.434) (.402) (.446)
Number of children
up to 2 years old .039 .082 .020
(.200) (.286) (.140)
between 3− 5 .100 .175 .066
(.326) (.423) (.264)
between 6− 16 .502 .648 .436
(.818) (.952) (.740)
Du. no. child. .607 .517 .648
(.488) (.500) (.478)
Partner/Spouse variablesa)
Single .212 .145 .242
(.409) (.352) (.428)
Net wage partner/spouse 1450.245 1409.635 1471.591
(1117.829) (1234.772) (1050.547)
Age partner/spouse 45.789 47.774 44.745
(11.164) (12.125) (10.474)
Age sq. partner/spouse 2221.217 2429.394 2111.787
(1046.820) (1169.002) (958.543)
Exp. partner/spouse 22.569 24.399 21.607
(11.186) (11.769) (10.743)
Exp. sq. partner/spouse 634.506 733.833 582.293
(525.858) (582.168) (485.620)
Educ. partner/spouse 12.171 11.776 12.379
(2.622) (2.560) (2.630)
Educ sq. partner/spouse 155.015 145.226 160.161
(71.257) (68.108) (72.329)
Du. flag miss. .041 .032 .046
(.199) (.175) (.209)
N 57,203 17,867 39,336
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. All summary statistics are on individual-year level. Standard errors
are in parenthesis.
a) The reported sample statistics for these variables are conditional on non-missing data (Du. flag miss. = 0) and
having a partner/being married (Single = 0).
27
Table 15: Summary, Wage Equation, Men, 1995-2006
Mean Std. dev. 10% pctl. 90% pctl.
Log. hourly wage 2.571 .427 2.051 3.093
Log. health sat. 2.596 .366 2.095 2.893
Age 41.174 10.350 28.0 56.0
Age sq. 1802.446 875.795 784.0 3136.0
Age tr. 83201.150 58815.110 21952.0 175616.0
Unempl. exp. .403 1.099 0 1.200
Unempl. exp. sq. 1.371 9.031 0 1.440
Firm tenure 11.392 10.118 1.100 27.200
Firm tenure sq. 232.165 351.910 1.210 739.840
Education 12.371 2.634 10.5 18.0
Du. educ. .143 .350 0 1
Part-time .022 .147 0 0
Foreigner .117 .321 0 1
State level variables
Log. unempl. (fed. st.) 12.805 .550 12.160 13.660
Log. vac. (fed. st.) 10.494 .809 9.192 11.428
Log. empl. (fed. st.) 14.720 .728 13.586 15.563
East Germany .221 .415 0 1
Number of children
up to 2 years old .087 .296 0 0
between 3− 5 .125 .361 0 1
between 6− 16 .501 .825 0 2
Du. no. child. .575 .494 0 1
Firm size (< 20 employees)a)
20− 199 .301 .459 0 1
200− 1999 .235 .424 0 1
≥ 2000 .256 .437 0 1
Firm size miss. .023 .149 0 0
Occupation Dummies (High Service)
Low Service .185 .388 0 1
Routine non-manual .040 .196 0 0
Skilled manual .305 .460 0 1
Semi-unskilled manual .212 .408 0 1
Farm labour .012 .109 0 0
Missing occ. .090 .287 0 0
Sector Dummies (Agr., forestry, fishing)
Unknown sector .029 .169 0 0
Energy, water, mining .016 .124 0 0
Manufacturing .363 .481 0 1
Construction .108 .311 0 1
Trade .084 .278 0 0
Transport, communication .042 .200 0 0
Financial serv., insurance .024 .153 0 0
Other services .090 .287 0 0
State .230 .421 0 1
Exclusion restrictions/Instruments
num. vis. doc. (last 3 months) 1.745 3.328 0 4.0
Log. non lab. inc. 5.382 2.939 0 8.114
Single .205 .404 0 1
Flag miss. .026 .161 0 0
Net wage partner/spouseb) 602.324 633.724 0 1450.677
Age partner/spouse 40.308 9.656 28.0 54.0
Age sq. partner/spouse 1717.997 806.792 784.0 2916.0
Exp. partner/spouse 10.179 8.735 .800 23.700
Exp. sq. partner/spouse 179.920 277.926 .640 561.690
Educ. partner/spouse 12.017 2.415 9.0 16.0
Educ. sq. partner/spouse 150.249 64.354 81.0 256.0
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. All summary statistics are on individual-year level 47,746 observa-
tions). Individuals with participation in only one year and individuals with missing wages are dropped from the
sample. a) For dummy variables, the basis categories are given in parenthesis; b) the reported sample statistics
for these variables are conditional on non-missing data (Du. flag miss. = 0) and having a partner/being married
(Single = 0).
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Table 16: Summary, Wage Equation, Women, 1995-2006
Mean Std. dev. 10% pctl. 90% pctl.
Log. hourly wage 2.350 .432 1.807 2.845
Log. health sat. 2.580 .381 2.095 2.893
Age 40.661 10.321 26.0 55.0
Age sq. 1759.862 849.240 676.0 3025.0
Age tr. 80244.280 55620.660 17576.0 166375.0
Unempl. exp. .488 1.209 0 1.500
Unempl. exp. sq. 1.699 12.051 0 2.250
Firm tenure 9.340 8.688 .900 22.900
Firm tenure sq. 162.715 271.736 .810 524.410
Education 12.325 2.481 10.0 16.0
Du. educ. .129 .335 0 1
Part-time .382 .486 0 1
Foreigner .090 .286 0 0
State level variables
Log. unempl. (fed. st.) 12.785 .552 12.150 13.630
Log. vac. (fed. st.) 10.422 .835 9.118 11.428
Log. empl. (fed. st.) 14.658 .748 13.560 15.562
East Germany .268 .443 0 1
Number of children
up to 2 years old .019 .139 0 0
between 3− 5 .065 .262 0 0
between 6− 16 .434 .736 0 2
Du. no. child. .648 .478 0 1
Firm size (< 20 employees)a)
20− 199 .295 .456 0 1
200− 1999 .219 .414 0 1
≥ 2000 .193 .395 0 1
Firm size miss. .026 .160 0 0
Occupation Dummies (High Service)
Low Service .256 .437 0 1
Routine non-manual .197 .398 0 1
Skilled manual .068 .251 0 0
Semi-unskilled manual .173 .378 0 1
Farm labour .009 .092 0 0
Missing occ. .229 .421 0 1
Sector Dummies (Agr., forestry, fishing)
Unknown sector .032 .176 0 0
Energy, water, mining .004 .060 0 0
Manufacturing .167 .373 0 1
Construction .016 .125 0 0
Trade .154 .361 0 1
Transport, communication .023 .150 0 0
Financial serv., insurance .031 .172 0 0
Other services .204 .403 0 1
State .364 .481 0 1
Exclusion restrictions/Instruments
num. vis. doc. (last 3 months) 2.365 3.518 0 5.0
Log. non lab. inc. 5.346 3.039 0 8.175
Single .242 .428 0 1
Flag miss. .046 .208 0 0
Net wage partner/spouseb) 1476.293 1048.302 0 2644.976
Age partner/spouse 44.698 10.410 31.0 59.0
Age sq. partner/spouse 2106.237 951.393 961 3481
Exp. partner/spouse 21.570 10.701 7.0 36.0
Exp. sq. partner/spouse 579.760 482.760 49.0 1296.0
Educ. partner/spouse 12.395 2.632 10.50 18.0
Educ. sq. partner/spouse 160.553 72.444 110.250 324.0
Source: GSOEP 1995-2006, own calculations. All summary statistics are on individual-year level (37,670 obser-
vations). Individuals with participation in only one year and individuals with missing wages are dropped from the
sample. a) For dummy variables, the basis categories are given in parenthesis; b) the reported sample statistics
for these variables are conditional on non-missing data (Du. flag miss. = 0) and having a partner/being married
(Single = 0).
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